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Mixed oligopoly with one welfare-maximizing public and several profit-
maximizing private firms exists in many economies. De Fraja and 
Delbono (1989) have analysed mixed oligopoly taking into account how 
the public firm behaves vis-à-vis the private firms on the basis of a linear 
market demand function and symmetric firms. They have found that the 
social welfare is greater in Stackelberg mixed oligopoly where the public 
firm acts as a leader than in Cournot mixed oligopoly where all firms 
simultaneously determine their outputs. A partial public firm tries to 
maximize the weighted average of the social welfare and its profits. Under 
some conditions, partial privatization of a public firm leads to greater 
social welfare than Cournot mixed oligopoly where the public firm is fully 
public (see Matsumura (1998) for duopoly and Okuguchi (2012) for 
oligopoly). In this paper we will prove that neither partial nor full 
privatization of a public firm is optimal in a general Stackelberg mixed 
oligopoly where the public firm acts as a leader and all private firms as 
followers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The existence of mixed oligopoly where a public firm and private ones 
coexist have been observed and analyzed first by Merrill and Schneider (1966), 
and later by Harris and Wiens (1980), Beato and Mas-Colell (1982), Boes 
(1986,1991),and Creamer et al (1987) among others. De Fraja and Delbono 
(1989) (see also De Fraja and Delbono,1990) have compared the welfare of 
mixed oligopoly consisting of one fully public firm and several symmetric private 
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firms for four possible cases distinguished by the public firm’s behavior in 
relationship to all private firms. They have assumed a linear market demand 
function for an identical good produced by all firms and the same quadratic cost 
function for all firms ,and found, among other things, that the social welfare is 
greater in Stackelberg mixed oligopoly where the public firm acts as a leader and 
all private firms behave as followers than in Cournot (or Nash) mixed oligopoly 
where the public and private firms simultaneously choose their outputs. Some 
more recent contributions to Stackelberg mixed oligopoly, especially in 
relationship with the effects of subsidies to firms , include Poyago-
Theotoky(2001), Myles (2002), Cornes and Sepahvand (2003), Fjell and 
Heywood (2004,2007) and Zikos (2007).Myles (2002) adopts most general 
approach among them and assumes away a linear market demand function and 
quadratic cost funcions.However, he assumes identical cost functions for all 
firms,including the public one. 
A partial public firm whose manager maximizes the weighted average of 
the social welfare and its profits have widely been observed in many economies. 
Under certain conditions, partial privatization of a public firm results in greater 
social welfare than in Cournot mixed oligopoly where the public firm is under 
full control of the government. This has been shown by Matsumura(1998) for 
duopoly and by Okuguchi(2012) for oligopoly. In this paper we will 
systematically analyze under very general conditions on the market demand and 
firms’ cost functions whether partial or full privatization of a public firm in 
Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with a public firm as  a leader isoptimal or not . We 
will find that neither partial nor full privatization of the public firm is 
optimal.This non-optimality result coincides with the one earlier obtained by De 
Fraja and Delbono(1989) for their simple case of a linear market demand function 
and the identical cost function for all firms.We will be able to derive our result 
remarkably easily by taking the public firm’s rest of the industry output as an 
analytical strategic variable, as it is uniquely related to its own output as shown 
below. 
Before concluding this introductory section, we would like to point out 
the pioneering paper on Stackelberg oligopoly with only private firms by Sherali 
et al.(1983) from the algorithmic point of view of computing the Stackelberg 
equilibrium.  
 
2. MODEL AND ANALYSİS 
Let there be one public firm(firm 0) and n asymmetric profit-maximizing 
private firms. Let iπ , ni ,...,1,0= ,be firm i’s profits, W be the social welfare as 
the sum of firm’s profits and the consumers’ surplus, and 
00 )1( παα −+≡ WU  be the partial public firm’s objective function, where the 
parameter ∈α [0,1] is the weight the government attaches to the social welfare . 
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If 0=α ,the public firm becomes a private profit-maximizing firm and if , 







 be the industry total output, 
where ix  is firm i’s output, )(Xpp =  the inverse market demand function, 
where p is the price of a homogeneous good of the industry and p’<0 for X such 
that 0>p , and )( ii xC  be firm i’s cost function. Then, by definition of the 
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We now formulate Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with a partial public 
firm as a leader and all private firms as followers. The public firm’s objective 
function is 0U  defined above and equals to the weighted average of the social 
welfare and its profits. We rewrite the firm’s profit function as 
,,...,1,0),()( 00 nixCXxpx iiii =−+= −π                               (3) 







0  is the rest of the industry 
output for the public firm. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) have assumed a linear 
market demand function for the good and an identical quadratic cost function for 
all firms, while Beato and Mas-Colell (1982) have used a linear market demand 
function and general cost functions for mixed duopolists. We will, however, 
assume general demand and cost functions which are assumed to satisfy: 
Assumption 1: niCpniC ii ,...,2,1,,,...,1,0,0
"'' =<=> . 
Assumption 2: .,...,2,1,0,"' nipxp i =<+  
Now let the leader’s output 0x  be given.Then private firm i maximizes 
its profit with respect to its own output on the basis of the Cournot behavioristic 










,      (4) 
where we have assumed an interior maximum.The Assumption 2 implies 
that any two private firm’s outputs are strategic substitutes each other. Note that 
the second order condition holds under Assumptions 1 and 2. We note in passing 
that the equation (4) shows that the private firms are playing an aggregative game 
among themselves(see Okuguchi and Yamazaki(2014)). 
Solving (4) with respect to ix  as a function of 00 −+ Xx , we have 
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Note that (5) is not the reaction function in the traditional sense of the 
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Solving  (7)  with respect to the leader’ output, we have 
)( 00 −Ψ≡ Xx ,                                                    (8) 
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We can give an diagrammatic derivation of (8) as follows.If the public 
firm’s output is  ,the solution of (7) corresponds to the intersection 'E of a 





− + Xxϕ  and the 45 degree line originating 




Figure1The solution of (7) 
If the public firm’s output increases to  ,the curve shift 
downwards,and the new intersection becomes "E ,hence    <  for  
<  . 






















































where we have taken into account (5) and (8).Given α ,the manager of the public 
firm maximizes its objective function 0U  with respect to its outpu 0x ,that is,with 
respect to its rest of the industry output 0−X in light of (8).The first order 
condition for maximization of 0U  with respect to 0−X  is rewritten as 
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In order to show the validity of this assumption,consider the following 
case in which the market demand function is linear, the public firm’s cost 




0 ===−= .                (12) 
A simple calculation yields 
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{ } 0)1(2)1()( 200' <+++−=− n
ncbnXB ,                                          (16) 
 
{ }bcnncacabnC )2()1)((0 +−+−+≡ .                                                 (17) 
In view of Inequaliti s (15) and (16),we know tha the second order 
condition is satisfied for the model given by (12). 
Under the Assumption 3,we solve (11) with respect to 0−X  as a 
function of the parameter α . 
)(00 α−− ≡ XX ,                                                    (18) 
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 for 0≠B .                                (22) 
This proves that if 0≠B , the social welfare is maximized for 1=α , 






In this paper we have analyzed whether partial or full privatization of a 
public firm coexisting with several profit-maximizing private firms is optimal in 
the sense of social welfare maximization.We have given the role of leadership to 
the public firm which is assumed to be maximizing its objective function as the 
weighted sum of the social welfareand its profits, and the followership role to all 
private firms. We have found without assuming a linear market demand function 
and quadratic cost functions for all firms that neither parial nor full privatization 
of the public firm is optimal. This finding is in sharp contrast with that of  the 
optimality  of partial privatization of the public firm in Cournot mixed oligopoly 
where all firms are assumed to act as Cournot oligopolists.                  
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